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I.  Introduction 
 
Historically, the US Dollar had been accepted as the strongest currency and it had no 
competition at the regional or global level. But inception of Euro changed this unique 
stature and status enjoyed by USD. With introduction of Euro as the common currency, 
the European Union became USA’s closest competitor in terms of economic size, 
performance, indicators and political and economic clout. Over time, value of euro 
started appreciating and accordingly, Euro/USD exchange rate which is fully floating, 
started rising.  
A rising Euro affects the US economy in three ways: directly, indirectly and through a 
cascading effect caused by an interaction of these direct and indirect influences. This 
paper attempts to identify and explore the effects of an appreciating Euro on some select 
economic indicators of the US, both historically and projected. It also establishes the 
relationship between some of these indicators which are not directly cross-related, by 
analyzing the impact of the Euro on the economy’s most sensitive economic parameters. 
Section I briefly touches upon the scope and objective of this paper. Section II 
introduces the concept of exchange rate, different exchange rate regimes and 
determinants of exchange rates. Section III views the historical relationship between the 
Euro/USD exchange rate and the most important macroeconomic indictors of the US 
economy. Section IV explores the projected impact of potential future Euro/USD 
exchange rate on the same indictors and explains the linkages. Section V concludes.  
 
II.  Exchange Rate: Basics 
 
When the exchange rate specifies the number of units of domestic currency that could 
be purchased using one unit of foreign currency, such a system is known as a Direct-
Quote X-rate (e.g. 1 EUR = 1.12 USD is a Direct-Quote in US). But when the X-Rate 
specifies the number of units of foreign currency that a unit of domestic currency can buy, 
it is known as Indirect-Quote (e.g. 1 USD = 0.89 EUR is Indirect-Quote in US). 
Such clarification depends on the specific country in question. 
 
II.A.  Exchange Rates Regimes 
 
There are three primary X-rate regimes: 
a) Fixed X-rate 
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b) Floating (Flexible) X-rate and 
c) Intermediate X-Rate regime. 
In a fixed X-Rate regime, the monetary authority (Central bank) fixes the exchange rate 
of the domestic currency vis-à-vis foreign currencies, and the domestic currency value 
does not depend on forex market demand and supply forces. Chinese Yuan is an 
example of a fixed currency. The EU, too, prefers intra-European fixed rates, and the 
Euro floats against USD and Yen. 
In a flexible regime, the currency value increases (appreciates) and decreases 
(depreciates) based on currency market demand and supply of forex. As the demand-
supply conditions change, the X-rate also changes accordingly. Predicting the value of a 
floating-rate currency is much difficult, since its value depends on multiple external and 
internal economic and non-economic conditions.  
The USD floats against most major currencies, because for the US, international trade is 
less important than it is for many other countries - and also, the US is not willing to 
subordinate its domestic economic policies to an exchange rate objective. Often 
countries adopt an X-rate system that is neither rigidly fixed nor fully flexible. For 
example, the Central Bank can “peg” its currency with a dominant currency in world 
market, most often this chosen currency is that of its most dominant trade partner. Most 
of such pegging is done to the USD which is considered as one of the strongest “hard 
currencies” in world market. As and when the USD value changes, the domestic 
currency value also changes proportionately. 
Again, the central banks can fix a “band” within which they allow the domestic currency 
to move, but if the currency value goes outside this band, they intervene in the forex 
market and implement required policy adjustments to bring the currency value within the 
target band.   
 
II.B.  Applying X-Rate Regimes: Pros and Cons 
 
 A fixed X-rate regime removes sudden and unexpected volatility and the consequent 
forex market shocks arising out of changes in currency value. However, to ensure 
effective implementation of a fixed X-Rate, the monetary authority has to ensure a sound 
and effective regulatory body controlling the policy decisions and their impacts. Also, the 
internal domestic objectives have to move in tandem with the currency objective. Often, 
adoption of a fixed currency regime works in detriment to the domestic monetary 
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objectives under the influence of the so-called “Trilemma of Impossible Trinity”, as 
advocated by the Mundell-Fleming Model. 
This model states that out of several objectives of the monetary authority, there are three 
which can not be satisfied simultaneously: Exchange Rate Stability, Capital Market 
Integration and Monetary Autonomy. A combination of any two of these has to be 
satisfied at the cost of the third one, since that can no more be achieved. 
 
 
Any pair of goals is achievable by adopting a suitable payments regime abandoning the 
third. In particular, 
• Exchange stability and capital market integration can be covered by adopting a 
fixed X-rate regime, but by giving up monetary authority. Thus the authorities 
lose the power of changing the domestic interest rate independently of foreign 
interest rate. 
• Monetary autonomy can be combined with Capital market integration by giving 
up Exchange stability. Authorities can freely choose the domestic interest rate 
but must accept the market-dictated (floating) exchange rate. 
• Exchange stability can be combined with Monetary Autonomy by giving up 
Capital Market integration – in presence of capital controls, the interest-
rate/exchange-rate link breaks. 
Monetary Autonomy      Capital Market Integration 
 Impossible Trinity  
   Exchange Rate Stability 
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Thus, adopting a fixed X-Rate regime necessitates giving up the control over one of the 
two important domestic policy instruments: Capital Control and Interest Rate. In such 
situation, an external shock can often get transformed into an interest rate shock. 
There are other difficulties in fixing the X-Rate. First, if private capital inflows can not be 
restrained, fixing the rate is difficult. Second, if the major hard currencies float against 
one another, to which currency should the domestic currency be pegged? Third, a fixed 
exchange rate does not automatically adjust the trade balance as floating rate does. 
At the other end of the spectrum, floating X-Rates adjust quickly to changing demand-
supply patterns and this automatic adjustment mechanism allows a country to mitigate 
the effects of external shocks and business cycle variations in other countries. It also 
negates the possibility of a BOP crisis. However, a freely floating X-Rate increases forex 
exposure volatility. In the financial and corporate balance sheets, if the liabilities are 
denominated in a free-float currency and assets denominated in domestic currency, a 
sudden depreciation of the foreign currency deteriorates the financial position, and this 
comes as a threat to domestic financial stability. 
This reason creates a higher “fear of float” especially amongst the emerging economies, 
since they have smaller variations of nominal X-Rate but face bigger shocks and interest 
rate and reserve movements. 
In between these two extremes, there are intermediate regimes like managed float which 
the countries often adopt. Normally the X-Rate is allowed to float ‘freely’, but if it falls 
beyond a certain (pre-targeted) band, central bank intervenes and exercises 
contractionary or expansionary measures to bring the rate within the range again. But a 
huge cost associated with this policy is the cost of such intervention measures 
(sterilization, for example) – but the main issue here is that even though the cost to the 
economy of exercising intervention measures can be determined, the cost of not 
exercising it can not be precisely determined, and thus the actual effectiveness of such 
intervention measures can not be properly ascertained.  
Emerging economies mostly resort to the managed float regime. 
 
II.C.  Determinants of Exchange Rate 
 
This section explains the major determinants of X-Rate of two currencies. 
(a) Inflation Differential 
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If inflation rate is lower in a country, its domestic currency has higher purchasing power 
compared to that in other countries. So its currency value increases. 
If European Union has a lower overall inflation rate compared to US, then Euro would 
buy more goods and services compared to the USD and thus its value would appreciate. 
Accordingly the Euro/USD X-Rate would appreciate as well.  
(b) Interest-Rate Differential. 
If rate of interest is higher in EU compared to in US, rate of return is higher in EU which 
attracts more foreign currency in the form of FDI and FPI. This increases Euro X-rate 
compared to USD.  
However, if inflation is too high in EU, this effect can be mitigated. 
(c) Capital Inflows/Outflows 
Excessive capital inflows destabilize macroeconomic management through a real X-rate 
appreciation that causes “Dutch Disease” (situation where a large foreign aid/capital 
causes real X-rate appreciation that jeopardizes manufacturing prospects, and also 
threatens growth prospects).  
(c) Current Account Deficit/Trade Deficit. 
CAD implies an excess of imports over imports, thus more foreign currency is needed to 
pay for the imports than is generated through exports. Hence there is an excess demand 
for forex and this depresses domestic X-Rate. 
(d) Public debt. 
Huge public debt encourages inflation in the economy and then point (a) takes over. 
(e) Money Supply. 
Higher money supply leads to a lower rate of interest: point (b) takes over. 
(g) Output. 
If total output of a country increases, the interest rate rises, too. 
(h) Fiscal Policy 
The government budget deficit/surplus and the quantum of it often determine the 
demand and supply of forex. 
(i) Economic Growth Indicators 
(j) State of Economic Growth. 
During recession, generally forex demand reduces (due to lower forex transactions) and 
thus X-Rate goes down, ceteris paribus. 
(k) Confidence on the currency, and 
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(k) Expectations 
Expectations play a crucial role in determining an X-Rate. If the financial community 
perceives a currency to appreciate further after an appreciation takes place, its 
speculative activities would differ from what would have been, if they considered such 
appreciation as only temporal.  
 
II.D.  Determination of X-Rate: Flexible Regime 
This section graphically depicts the demand-supply based X-Rate determination 
mechanism when demand and supply changes (autonomously). 
 
 
      
Figure 1 
Panel (A) depicts the base case for X-Rate determination, where the rate is determined 
by intersection of the forex demand and supply curves. It may be noted that forex 
demand primarily gets generated through imports (since importers need forex to pay for 
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the imported products), and the base case forex supply is generated only through 
exports (since exporters receive foreign currency in exchange for their products). In this 
case, the equilibrium quantity of USD is Q
0
 and the EURO/USD X-Rate is e
0
.  
Any deviation in demand/supply of forex would change these values. Panel (B) depicts 
an increase in forex supply through addition of capital inflows, which generate more 
supply of forex into the financial system. Thus, supply schedule gets shifted rightwards 
from SS
0
 to SS
1
, intersecting the same demand curve, thus quantity of USD increases to 
Q
1
 but X-Rate reduces to e
1
. 
Panel (C) depicts a recessionary situation where forex demand inevitably gets lower and 
demand schedule shifts leftwards from DD
0
 to DD
1
. The quantity of USD as well as of X-
Rate decreases, to Q
1
 and e
1
 respectively. Finally, panel (D) describes the effect of a 
reduction of capital inflow which depresses the forex supply curve of panel (B) – SS
1
 – 
leftward to SS
2
, and USD quantity decreases to Q
2
 from Q
1
, and X-Rate appreciates to 
e
2
 from e
1
.                
 
II.E.  Euro/USD Exchange Rate  
 
The €/$ Exchange Rate has been showing an overall increasing trend as following graph 
shows. 
 
Figure 2: Euro/USD X-Rate: Quarterly Average
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Figure 2: Euro/USD Exchange Rate (Quarterly Average) 
Since the inception of Euro, it has been viewed by the financial world as a viable 
alternative to USD. Till then, the Dollar had been the dominant Currency in world 
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economy, since it had no competition – no other economy could come close to the US 
economy’s financial size. So, no other currency could acquire the network externalities, 
economies of scale and scope, and public goods benefit necessary to rival the Dollar at 
a global level. Thus, after Euro was adopted as the officially denominated currency by 
the European Union, it was considered as an alternative to USD in terms of strength and 
acceptability. The prime characteristics of any legal tender currency are its acceptability 
as a medium of exchange, as a store of value and as a unit of value. At a global level, its 
value is determined by the confidence of the stakeholders (the financial transmission 
and transaction units comprising the household and the institutions), perception about 
the future performance of the underlying economy and a combination of global economic 
and financial factors. Soon after its introduction, Euro satisfied all the above criteria and 
easily occupied the position of a “Hard Currency”. 
The Euro’s increasing popularity is caused by several underlying factors. First, the EU is 
comparable to US economy in terms of economic size (GDP) and trade openness index. 
Second, Euro-land has a feasibly controlled rate of inflation that hovers around a narrow 
band of 1.5-3 % on average. European Central bank (ECB) has been highly successful 
in keeping inflation under tight control. Thirdly, EU experiences no such tremendous 
pressure on account of current account deficit and public debt, as US does, to adversely 
affect its currency.  
 
II.F.  Two Crucial Determinants of EUR/USD X-Rate 
Euro’s value relative to USD depends on two crucial factors: First, the interest-rate 
differential between European Union (EU) and the US; and second, the inflation rate 
differential between the two.  
 
II.F.1. Interest Rate Differential and Exchange Rate 
 
In an international economic scenario, the exchange rate between two country’s 
currencies is a function of the differentia between their domestic interest rates: 
X-Rate
X,Y
 = f (r
X
 – r
Y
)  where 
X, Y are the two countries in question and ‘r’ represents the rate of interest. 
Going by above function, if EU has a higher rate of interest compared to that in US, the 
rate of return is higher in EU which attracts more foreign capital. This drives up the 
demand for Euro, and its value appreciates against the Dollar, causing a rise in the 
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Euro/USD exchange rate. This argument implies that Euro/USD exchange rate is 
positively correlated with the positive interest rate differential between EU and US. 
 
Figure 3: Interest Rate Differential & X-Rate
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Figure 3: Interest-Rate Differential & X-Rate 
Figure 3 considers the annual average interest-rate differential for EU & US and Euro-
USD X-Rate for the period 1998-2009 (available till date). Except for four years, the 
interest differential has always stayed positive, implying a higher interest rate in EU 
compared to in US. Correspondingly, the X-rate has shown a positive correlation with 
the change in this differential (Correlation analysis gives a correlation factor equal to 
0.1053). However, late-2008 and early-2009 show a reversal of this relationship, which 
can be attributed to the global financial turmoil and the consequent loss of faith in 
European economies by the external world. Such lack of confidence in Euro has caused 
its value to deteriorate in this phase. 
 
II.F.2. Inflation Rate Differential and Exchange Rate 
 
In the two-economy two-currency model, if EU has a lower inflation rate compared to 
that in the US, the purchasing power of Euro is higher compared to that of USD, and 
thus Euro gains more value compared to USD, and the X-Rate increases. Hence, the X-
Rate shows a negative correlation with any positive inflation differential across the EU 
and the US.  
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Figure 4: Inflation Differential & X-Rate
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Figure 4: Inflation Differential and X-Rate 
 
Figure-4 shows the quarterly average inflation rate differential and X-Rate for the period 
1998-2009 (latest data). For most of this period, inflation differential across the EU and 
the US has stayed negative, that is, EU inflation rate is lower compared to that in the US. 
Correspondingly the X-Rate has changed inversely with the direction of change on this 
differential (Correlation analysis gives a correlation equal to – 0.1439). The graph 
provides clear evidence that in the period when inflation difference was at the maximum, 
X-Rate touched its minimum; and the lowest interest differential value was coupled with 
the highest X-rate (Data Appendix contains quarterly values for some select indicators). 
 
II.G. Future Trend in Euro/USD Rate 
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Figure 5: Euro/USD X-Rate: Projected
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Figure 5: Projected X-Rate (Quarterly) 
Based on the trend analysis of quarterly average X-Rate values starting from first quarter 
of 1998, above projection is made for next seven years. The trend equation has been 
chosen (included in technical notes) keeping in mind the current and future possible 
states of the EU and US economies, market conditions and investor confidences, which 
taken together suggest a not so drastic increase in the Euro-Dollar rate from the present. 
However, based on an increasing trend in X-Rate, this paper chooses to focus on the 
cascading impact of a rising Euro-value on the US economy and its important economic 
indicators. 
 
III.  Impact of Changing Euro on US Economy: Historical Evidence 
 
III.A.  General Impacts of a Rising Euro on US Economy 
 
A consistent increase in value of Euro vis-à-vis US Dollar could have the following 
effects on the US economy in general. 
Exports & Imports 
A strengthening Euro (i.e. a weakening Dollar) would have immediate impact on the 
export sector of the US. The international exports price would rise proportionately with 
the Dollar depreciation, which would hit the global export competitiveness. As a result, 
the exports would shrink. Simultaneously, imports would become cheaper and hence the 
import volumes would increase. 
Trade Deficit 
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The combined effect of both the above factors would result in a worsened current 
account balance scenario: with lower exports and higher imports, the current account 
deficit (CAD) would increase. If the underlying situation continues for a prolonged period, 
the CAD as a percent of GDP would continue rising (since, GDP would shrink, too, as 
one of the essential components of GDP i.e. trade balance as defined by the excess of 
exports over imports would decrease). In absence of proper checks and balances at an 
early stage, such scenario could worsen out of bounds and become unsustainable, and 
an acute BOP crisis would be generated. 
Investment and Cost of Capital 
A strengthening Euro indicates an excess demand for it which includes investor demand 
as one of the underpinnings. A continued investor demand preference for Euro-
denominated bonds, securities or other kinds of investments compared to the Dollar-
denominated instruments would erode the American domestic investment 
competitiveness, since over time, US would lose its attraction to foreign investors as a 
preferred investment destination, who would chose the Euro-land instead. This would 
dry up the capital available to US firms, and as a result, their cost of capital would 
increase. 
Production, Prices, Inflation and Total Output 
An increased cost of capital would deter the investment by these firms, and accordingly 
in medium-to-long term, owing to lack of any expansionary investments, their production 
would go down. This would immediately affect prices which would go up. A sustained 
and continuous price-hike situation would fuel inflation. Eventually, higher prices and 
lower production would depress the national output, too. 
External Debt 
A rising Euro against USD would worsen the US external debt position, since in such 
case; the US would have to pay out more Dollars to settle the same amount of Euro-
denominated debt. Unless this is controlled, US could find itself in a debt trap. The US 
already has a huge public debt amounting to USD 10.55 trillion as on April 2009, and 
this amount had been steadily increasing over last ten years. 
 
III.B.  Rising Euro and the US Economy: Historical Evidence 
 
This section inspects the empirical evidence on the direct-impact, indirect and trickle 
down effects of changes in the Euro-Dollar X-Rate on specific US economic indicators. 
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III.B.1.  Direct-Impact Indicators 
 
Exports, Imports and Trade Balance 
Figure 6: Exports and Imports (USD-
Trillion)
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Figure 7: Trade Deficit and X-Rate
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             Figure 6: Exports & Imports                       Figure 7: Trade Deficit & X-Rate 
Over the chosen period (1998-2009), growth in exports has lagged much behind that of 
imports. Correspondingly, trade deficit has risen almost at a steady pace, though there 
has been a sharp decline in this indicator in the last two quarters. As figure 7 shows, 
trade deficit and X-Rate have moved almost hand-in-hand along the quarters. 
Correlation analysis yields coefficients with X-rate equal to 0.6219, 0.6278 and 0.5546 
with exports, imports and trade deficits, respectively . However, Q3-2008 onwards both 
the trade indicators have registered steep decline due to general economic conditions, 
US financial crisis and its ripple effect on the world economy, and loss of confidence on 
both USD and Euro. 
 
III.B.2.  Indirect Indicators 
 
GDP 
A changing X-Rate does not affect the GDP directly. But the GDP gets impacted by 
changes in exports and imports caused by a change in the X-Rate. This impact takes 
place by the “Multiplier Mechanism”, which measures the change in GDP arising from a 
unit change in exports and/or imports. 
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Figure 8: Nominal GDP & X-Rate
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Figure 8: Nominal GDP & X-Rate 
Figure 8 reveals a continuously rising trend in nominal GDP (measured in current prices), 
keeping in pace of a positively trended X-Rate. The nominal GDP shows correlation of 
0.752 and 0.7742 with exports and imports respectively. 
 
Investment  
Figure 9: Private Domestic Investment & X-
Rate
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Figure 10: FDI in US & X-Rate
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   Figure 9: Private Investment and X-Rate             Figure 10: FDI in US & X-Rate 
Above graphs validate the logic put forward earlier: as Euro-Dollar X-Rate appreciates; 
US-bound investment (FDI) and private domestic investment both fall. This relationship 
is more prominent for FDI in US: almost every change in direction in X-Rate is 
accompanied by an opposite directional change in the quantum of inbound FDI 
(Correlation coefficient among these two parameters is 0.144). 
External Debt 
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Figure 11: X-Rate and US Federal Debt
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Figure 11: US Federal Debt and X-Rate 
Since 1998, US has been showing a continuous and steady increase in its total federal 
debt. This steady trend is complemented by a similar trend in the X-Rate. 
 
III.B.3. Trickle-Down Factors 
 
This section discusses some of the important “Trickle-Down” effects generated through 
the interaction of above economic indicators. 
I) GDP 
As the previous sections explained, GDP in US is not directly impacted by the change in 
Euro-Dollar X-Rate, but through the changes in trade parameters like exports and 
imports that have direct influence on the GDP: if exports fall and/or imports rise, GDP 
would shrink. 
The basic national accounting identity splits GDP into four major components: 
Output (GDP) = Consumption Expenditure + Private Investment Expenditure + 
Government Spending + [Exports – Imports], where the last term is the Trade Balance. 
Any change in these four components would change the GDP value in the same 
direction. However, GDP may not be changed by the same quantity of change in its 
components, due to the multiplier effect(s). For example, a unit increase in consumption 
would not change GDP by one unit, but more than one unit, since the increase in 
consumption gives rise to multiple “Ripple-Effects” across the economic entities. Taken 
together, these effects add up to a more-than-unity increase in GDP. 
Measuring the multipliers for consumption, investment, government spending and trade 
requires complex econometric analysis. Secondly, in reality, some of these components 
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are interlinked with one another so that such analysis has to take care of the problem of 
Multi-Collinearity. This paper has excluded these analyses and measurements for the 
sake of simplification, and thus, the econometric modeling for GDP is out of scope of this 
paper. 
Instead, this section focuses on identifying the contribution of the components of GDP 
for the period under consideration, and focus on some of the emerging patterns. 
Figure 12: Contribution to GDP:USD Trillion
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Figure 13: Contribution to GDP: By %
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    Figure 12: Contribution to GDP ($-T)             Figure 13: Contribution to GDP by % 
Both the above graphs show similar trends. In terms of absolute value contribution, 
consumption expenditure occupies the top position, followed by government spending, 
private investment and finally net exports (trade deficit). Over the years, a declining 
pattern can be observed for private investment, whereas government spending and net 
exports have been increasing. But, whereas for net exports, this increase have been 
from $35-billion to $140-billion, government budget deficit (as defined by the excess of 
government expenditures over government receipts) has shot up from a situation of 
budgetary surplus to a deficit of $1.14-trillion over the same period. 
Figure 14: Trade Deficit(Net Exports): $-B
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Figure 15: Government Budget Deficit ($-B)
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              Figure 14: Net Exports ($-B)           Figure 15: Government Budget Deficit ($-B) 
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The trend-lines for both these indicators display a gradually increasing trend over the 
period, which is expected to continue in future with high probability. 
Two points are to be noted here. One, late-2008 onwards the net exports have come 
down sharply, due to fall in exports and hike in imports caused by a weak dollar and 
other policy impacts. Two, government budget deficit has taken a sharp rising trend over 
this period as well, which is an aftermath of US government’s attempts to control the 
financial collapse in its financial system, and thus various multi-billion dollar corporate 
bail-out deals implemented by the finance ministry. The crisis has affected the budget 
deficit in two ways: first, one of the major components of budget deficit – tax receipts – 
have been adversely affected by the failure of corporate and the public to stay afloat 
(bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers being a heavy blow to the financial system), and 
second, the additional expenses incurred by the government to pull out the troubled 
segment have added to the deficit. 
In terms of percentage contribution too, consumption spending comprises the maximum 
share of the GDP pie (more than 60% consistently), followed by government spending 
(15-20%), private investment (10-15%) and net exports. As Figure 15 depicts, the share 
of private investment is consistently falling over time in percentage terms, too. With an 
active and operative Lag Effect, this situation would result in a shrinking GDP with one or 
two quarters of lag period. 
Taking all above factors into consideration, this section concludes that even though the 
GDP would rise in future, the growth rate would show a declining trend (However, such 
decline can not be attributed solely to the trickle-down effect of a rising Euro, since it 
would be intertwined with the financial distress that the US is going through).  
II) Money Supply 
Whereas money demand determines the rate of interest in theory, the supply of money 
is linked with inflation rate. The mechanism works both ways: when money supply 
increases in the economy, “too much money chases too few goods” (as production is 
“sticky” in the short-run, and can not respond to an increased demand immediately), and 
inflation soars (the reverse happens if money supply decreases). Again, when inflation is 
high, the central banks apply contractionary mechanisms and instruments to reduce the 
money supply in the economy. Accordingly, when money supply is the starting point in 
the transmission mechanism, it is positively correlated with inflation rate. But if inflation 
rate is the starting point, there is an inverse relationship with money supply. 
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Figure 16: Money Supply & Inflation Rate
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Figure 16: Money Supply & Inflation Rate 
Above graph considers the inflation rate as the starting point, and money supply as the 
consequent policy outcome. It shows an overall inverse relationship between these two 
parameters, other than some exception periods. 
An important implication of the above situation is as follows. If in period t inflation goes 
up, Fed responds by a tighter monetary policy by squeezing the excess money supply in 
its financial system. The impact gets rolled over to period t+1, when a reduced supply of 
money coupled with an unchanged money demand (ceteris paribus, assumed) 
generates an excess demand of money. This induces inflation. A higher inflation rate in 
US, in combination of an unchanged inflation rate in EU (under assumption of ceteris 
paribus) causes the Euro/USD exchange rate to go up. Thus, money supply influences 
the X-Rate through a trickle-down mechanism. Figure 16 displays a rising trend in the 
inflation rate in the US which conforms to the rising Euro over the period. 
III) US Direct Investment Abroad 
A strong Euro ensures more foreign investment into EU, particularly driven by the higher 
interest rate in EU in comparison to that in US. As US interest rate (equal to the rate of 
return to outside investors) plunges relatively, US domestic investors funnel away their 
investments from the US economy to other countries which offer a higher rate of return 
against their investment. 
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Figure 17: US Investment Abroad & Domestic 
Interest Rate
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Figure 17: US Investment Abroad & Interest Rate 
Figure 17 shows that the domestic interest rate and US investment abroad are inversely 
related, which confirms the logic cited above. Over the years, Fed has been steadily 
decreasing the interest rate to boost internal credit creation and eventual expansion of 
domestic firms. But such a policy is leading to the myopic event of over-dependence of 
the internal credit system and on the financial institutions, moving away from using 
domestic savings to be available for investment purposes. With a rapidly declining 
confidence on all financial institutions in the US following the credit crunch and financial 
collapse, this policy is detrimental to restoring the financial health in a sustained manner. 
 
IV) Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment rate in US is not directly influenced by the Euro value. If GDP growth 
rate declines, along with a decline in domestic production and investment, a stagnant 
internal industry would give rise to increasing unemployment rate. 
Figure 18: Growth Rate: Unemployment & 
Nominal GDP
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Figure 18: Growth in Unemployment and Nominal GDP 
This graph depicts a positive relationship between nominal GDP growth and 
unemployment rate. In most of the period, they tend to move in tandem. 
 
IV.  Rising Euro in Future: Projected Impact on US Economy 
 
As Section II predicts, the Euro is expected to appreciate vis-à-vis USD in the near 
future, albeit at a modest rate, since the current scenario has eroded the financial 
community’s confidence on not only Dollar but on Euro as well. This section examines 
the potential impact of the appreciation of Euro/USD X-rate on the economic indicators 
of US discussed in the previous section. 
The projected data considers the projection period up to the last quarter of 2017, on a 
quarterly basis. 
 
IV.A.  Direct-Impact 
 
Exports, Imports and Trade Balance 
Figure 19: Exports & Imports: Projected ($-T)
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Figure 20: Net Exports ($-T)
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  Figure 19: Exports & Imports (Projected)         Figure 20: Trade Balance (Projected) 
Exports show an almost stagnant/non-increasing trend whereas imports rise steadily. 
Consequently the trade deficit registers a steady increase and touches a value of $-348 
billion at the end of the period. This constancy in exports trend might be attributed to the 
factor that US being one of the most advanced (developed) economies, its overall 
growth rate has become quite low compared to other developing or emerging economies, 
and thus keeping in pace with low growth, the exports growth also has become lower. 
Secondly, the trend analysis has factored in the current turmoil economic conditions in 
the US and thus has discounted in the patterns in economic trends. Thirdly, of late the 
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Euro has been gradually losing confidence on the part of investors, and thus USD is 
forecasted to be gaining importance once again, in which case a strengthening dollar 
would ensure higher quantum from exports proceeds. 
 
IV.B.  Indirect Impact 
 
GDP 
The GDP projection is a result of a multiple regression model with the independent 
(input) variables being consumption expenditure, private domestic investment, 
government spending and net exports. Each of these four components has been 
projected using linear trend projection method. Individual projected contribution of the 
components to total GDP, in value terms and in % terms, would be discussed in a 
separate sub-section. 
Figure 21: Nominal GDP ($-T)
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Figure 21: Nominal GDP (Projected) 
 
Investment and Interest Rate 
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Figure 24: Private Domestic Investment & Interest 
Rate: Projected
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Figure 22: Private Inbound Investment & Interest Rate (Projected) 
Interest rate shows a steady and moderately steep decline in the forthcoming period 
(The Fed interest rate cut has been approaching the near-zero level to stimulate internal 
economy). Keeping in pace with that, private domestic investment shows an increase, 
though the growth rate of such investment is declining over time, conforming to an 
(projected) appreciating Euro. 
 
IV.C.  Trickle-Down Factors 
 
GDP: Component-Wise Breakup 
Figure 23: GDP: Contribution (USD-T): Projected
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Figure 24: GDP:Contribution (%): Projected
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      Figure 23: GDP Contribution ($-T)                   Figure 24: GDP Contribution (%) 
Whereas absolute value contribution of all the components show an increasing trend, in 
terms of percentage composition, consumption percent shows a steadily declining trend 
(from 62% to 59%) but rest of the components register projected increases, the extent 
being most for government spending and net exports.(see data table). However, the 
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composition change % is too small compared to the size of US economy to be 
considered a threat to the economy. 
 
Money Supply and Inflation 
 
Figure 25: Money SS & Inflation: Projected
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Figure 25: Money Supply & Inflation Rate (Projected) 
Money supply and inflation rate project a sharp inversely linear relationship. The inflation 
rate being the triggering event, as inflation goes down, Fed resorts to expansionary 
monetary policy to increase money supply to stabilize domestic financial system, and as 
money supply increases, interest rate falls. Figure 26 depicts the (projected) one-to-one 
relationship between inflation rate and interest rate: 
Figure 26: Inflation Rate & Interest Rate: 
Projected
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Figure 26: Inflation Rate & Interest Rate (Projected) 
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Figure 26 confirms the logic mentioned above. As inflation rate falls, through an increase 
in money supply, the interest rate gets affected and thus inflation and interest rate move 
in a linearly correlated pattern. They display a correlation factor of 0.7006. 
US Investment Abroad and Domestic Interest Rate 
 
Figure 27: US Investment Abroad & Interest Rate
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Figure 27: US Investment Abroad and US Interest Rate 
In response to a lower domestic interest rate, US investment abroad shows first a 
declining then increasing trend. The decreasing pattern can be explained using the 
interplay of two factors: one, in the initial projection period starting from Q1-2009, the 
financial crisis has left US with lower available capital to invest abroad; two, the lower 
domestic rate induces US corporate sector to utilize their available resources by raising 
loans domestically taking advantage of the lower cost of capital. However, once the 
crises get over, investor normality gets restored and overseas investments start 
replacing domestic investment. The previous discussions and figures have projected a 
gradually declining quantum of domestic private investment. 
 
Unemployment and GDP Growth Rate 
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Figure 28: Unemployment & GDP Growth %: 
Projected
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Figure 28: Unemployment & GDP Growth (Projected) 
The projected GDP growth rate displays a perfect ‘U’-shape, as a reflection of the 
current scenario extended up to the point when the trough is reached. Once the US 
economy gets over the damage factors caused by the crisis, it slowly starts 
strengthening on the recovery path. From mid-2013, the recovery in terms of growth rate 
is projected to start, and then gradually reaches the normal level. But rate of 
unemployment shows a gradual increase. Accordingly in the initial years the relative 
unemployment rate seems too high as the problem can not be cured based on a healthy 
growth rate. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The previous discussion makes clear the following points. 
1) An appreciating Euro vis-à-vis USD makes an immediate impact on exports, imports 
and trade balance in US, by deflating the former and inflating the latter two parameters. 
2) As exports decline and imports rise, GDP gets affected by the multiplier mechanism 
and gets reduced. However, decline in GDP in this case is not entirely dependent on the 
trade parameters only, but also owing to other factors which have not been considered 
in GDP change estimation.  
3) On the capital and investments front, both the US-bound investments (FDI) and 
private domestic investment in US decrease. 
4) Even though the GDP is projected to an increasing trend over the future, its growth 
rate is expected to decline. However, this factor can not be solely attributed to the 
appreciating Euro, as this is caused by a complex mix of numerous changes in 
economic variables. 
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5) So long as the EU-US inflation rate differential stays positive, US money supply 
shows an increasing trend which effects a downward movement of interest rate, which in 
turn causes a trickle-down effect on the Euro/USD exchange rate which appreciates. 
6) As fed reduces domestic interest rate, US investments abroad display a declining 
trend, and shows an inverse relationship with it. 
7) As GDP decreases by interplay of above factors, unemployment rate shoots up in the 
US. 
8) The projections predict an almost stagnant or slowly increasing exports, steadily 
increasing imports (where growth rate of imports is much higher than that of exports), 
and a steady and continuous rise in trade balance. This is a sign of a severe BOP crisis. 
9) Interest rates show a gradually declining projected patterns and keeping in pace with 
that, private domestic interest rate increases, albeit at a slow pace. 
10) In accordance with the projected decline in US inflation rate, money supply 
increases. 
11) Inflation rate and interest rates are projected to decline in tandem steadily over time. 
12) As interest rate keeps on declining in future, initially US overseas investment 
declines owing to present and lagged effects of the economic crisis, but thereafter slowly 
catches up with an increasing trend. 
13) Unemployment rate shows a steady increasing pattern whereas nominal GDP 
growth rate too declines in the first half of the projection period, and then rebounds and 
shows increasing trend.  
14) A much important point to be noted is that this paper mostly considers the economic 
indicators in isolation and as independent, ignoring the reality of existence of multi-
Collinearity amongst them, accordingly, this is a Partial Equilibrium Framework. 
15) This paper focuses solely on a two-country, multi-period model which excludes the 
interdependence of other economies on the US. 
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DATA  APPENDIX : HISTORICAL  DATA (SELECT) 
 
  E/$ Inf Ex Im TD GDP  Pvt Inv FDI 
Inv-
Abr MS Int U Grw 
Q1-
98 1.087 1.46 236 271 35 8.66 1.44 33.4 18.9 4.09 5.5 4.6 0.9 
Q2-
98 1.101 1.60 232 273 41 8.79 1.51 28.2 42.6 4.16 5.5 4.4 1.5 
Q3-
98 1.120 1.60 229 274 45 8.95 1.47 23.3 44.1 4.20 5.5 4.5 1.8 
Q4-
98 1.182 1.55 237 282 45 9.07 1.51 18.5 20.0 4.34 4.9 4.4 1.3 
Q1-
99 1.123 1.67 233 287 54 9.17 1.55 33.4 24.3 4.42 4.7 4.3 1.1 
Q2-
99 1.057 1.87 236 300 63 9.31 1.60 26.3 68.6 4.44 4.7 4.3 1.5 
Q3-
99 1.049 2.03 244 316 71 9.52 1.59 142.5 48.4 4.46 5.1 4.2 2.3 
Q4-
99 1.038 2.11 252 329 76 9.63 1.63 50.4 62.8 4.48 5.3 4.1 1.2 
Q1-
00 0.987 3.24 258 348 90 9.82 1.69 64.2 29.6 4.68 5.7 4.0 2.0 
Q2-
00 0.934 3.35 267 357 91 9.86 1.67 49.7 34.4 4.71 5.9 3.9 0.4 
Q3-
00 0.904 3.34 273 371 97 9.95 1.78 93.1 51.2 4.73 6.0 4.0 0.9 
Q4-
00 0.869 3.33 272 374 102 10 1.75 80.3 38.6 4.75 6.3 3.9 0.7 
Q1-
00 0.922 3.53 269 366 98 10.1 1.74 90.9 18.5 4.76 6.4 4.2 1.1 
Q2-
01 0.874 3.60 259 348 89 10.1 1.68 56.9 35.7 4.78 6.5 4.4 0.1 
Q3-
01 0.882 3.51 243 333 90 10.2 1.65 59.2 26.1 4.81 6.5 4.8 0.9 
Q4-
01 0.895 3.44 234 322 88 10.3 1.61 14.7 43.0 4.83 6.5 5.5 1.0 
Q1-
02 0.877 3.45 236 330 94 10.4 1.52 28.7 20.1 4.85 6.5 5.7 1.0 
Q2-
02 0.920 3.43 244 348 104 10.5 1.56 22.8 47.1 4.88 6.5 5.8 1.0 
Q3-
02 0.984 3.52 248 356 108 10.6 1.57 6.5 34.8 4.91 6.3 5.7 0.6 
Q4-
02 1.001 3.55 246 365 118 10.7 1.59 12.8 31.8 4.96 6.0 5.9 1.1 
Q1-
03 1.074 3.39 247 371 125 10.8 1.60 32.3 21.2 5.01 5.6 5.9 1.1 
Q2-
03 1.136 3.24 247 371 124 11.1 1.61 35.1 22.7 5.06 5.2 6.1 2.4 
Q3-
03 1.126 3.27 255 378 123 11.2 1.62 -5.8 44.5 5.10 4.8 6.1 1.2 
Q4-
03 1.190 3.38 269 394 125 11.4 1.69 -2.3 38.0 5.13 4.3 5.8 1.9 
Q1-
04 1.251 3.20 280 415 135 11.7 1.74 26.1 24.2 5.16 4.0 5.7 1.9 
 31 
Q2-
04 1.205 2.90 287 437 150 11.8 1.77 23.8 77.7 5.19 3.8 5.6 1.1 
Q3-
04 1.223 2.70 292 447 155 12 1.88 31.7 72.5 5.25 3.5 5.4 1.4 
Q4-
04 1.297 2.50 302 470 167 12.2 1.93 33.2 52.6 5.29 3.1 5.4 1.7 
Q1-
05 1.311 2.23 310 476 166 12.3 1.98 47.1 92.1 5.34 2.6 5.3 1.4 
Q2-
05 1.260 1.86 319 490 171 12.5 2.05 36.9 58.0 5.37 2.1 5.1 1.8 
Q3-
05 1.219 1.53 321 502 180 12.7 2.04 -7.6 38.6 5.41 1.9 5.0 1.2 
Q4-
05 1.189 1.28 333 527 194 13 2.08 37.6 -8.3 5.45 1.8 4.9 2.1 
Q1-
06 1.202 1.25 349 538 189 13.1 2.17 37.9 
-
72.9 5.47 1.7 4.7 1.3 
Q2-
06 1.257 1.42 360 552 192 13.3 2.24 37.0 58.4 5.48 1.7 4.7 0.9 
Q3-
06 1.274 1.43 368 565 197 13.4 2.25 64.0 43.4 5.49 1.7 4.6 0.9 
Q4-
06 1.290 1.30 380 555 175 13.5 2.23 55.0 68.1 5.51 1.8 4.4 1.0 
Q1-
07 1.311 1.24 385 565 180 13.7 2.16 80.6 51.8 5.54 1.7 4.5 1.6 
Q2-
07 1.348 1.44 400 579 179 14 2.12 12.7 68.5 5.58 1.7 4.5 1.6 
Q3-
07 1.375 1.59 425 593 168 14 2.15 63.3 91.3 5.61 1.7 4.7 0.6 
Q4-
07 1.449 1.78 435 609 174 14.2 2.16 105.5 66.1 5.65 1.7 6.0 0.9 
Q1-
08 1.500 1.91 452 630 178 14.3 2.09 51.4 87.8 5.69 1.6 5.0 1.0 
Q2-
08 1.563 2.20 475 657 181 14.4 2.06 79.7 95.7 5.73 1.4 5.6 0.8 
Q3-
08 1.502 2.06 486 667 181 14.2 2.00 107.1 83.7 5.76 1.3 6.3 -1.5 
Q4-
08 1.319 2.19 423 563 140 18.6 2.01 56.2 56.6 5.79 1.2 7.2 2.7 
Q1-
09 1.302 2.39 251 314 62 22.5 1.91 77.9 62.6 5.82 1.3 8.3 24.8 
 
Legends: 
 
E/$: Euro-USD X-Rate, Inf: Inflation Rate %, GDP: Nominal GDP (USD Trillion) 
Ex: Exports (USD-Billion), Im: Imports (USD Billion), TD: Trade Deficit (USD Billion) 
Pvt Inv: Private Domestic Investment in US (USD Trillion), Int: Interest Rate % 
FDI: FDI in US(USD Billion), Inv-Abr: Investment by US, Abroad (USD Billion) 
MS: Money Supply (USD Billion), U: Unemployment Rate % 
Grw: Nominal GDP Growth Rate % 
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DATA  APPENDIX : PROJECTED  DATA (SELECT) 
 
  E/$ Inf Ex Im TD GDP  Pvt Inv 
Inv-
Abr MS Int U Grw 
Q1-
09 1.499 2.39 0.357 0.608 0.2508 13.84 2.216 42.7 4.36 1.25 4.28 2.51 
Q2-
09 1.502 1.97 0.415 0.615 0.2005 13.95 2.233 41.5 4.7 2.22 4.32 2.27 
Q3-
09 1.505 1.96 0.416 0.623 0.2073 14.06 2.251 40.4 5.05 2.19 4.36 2.05 
Q4-
09 1.509 1.94 0.417 0.631 0.2141 14.17 2.269 39.4 5.38 2.17 4.4 1.85 
Q1-
10 1.512 1.92 0.418 0.639 0.2209 14.28 2.287 38.4 5.72 2.15 4.43 1.66 
Q2-
10 1.515 1.9 0.419 0.647 0.2278 14.38 2.304 37.6 6.05 2.13 4.47 1.48 
Q3-
10 1.517 1.88 0.42 0.655 0.2346 14.49 2.322 36.8 6.38 2.11 4.51 1.31 
Q4-
10 1.520 1.86 0.421 0.662 0.2415 14.6 2.34 36.2 6.71 2.1 4.55 1.16 
Q1-
11 1.523 1.84 0.422 0.67 0.2484 14.71 2.357 35.6 7.04 2.08 4.58 1.03 
Q2-
11 1.526 1.82 0.423 0.678 0.2554 14.82 2.375 35.1 7.37 2.06 4.62 0.9 
Q3-
11 1.529 1.8 0.424 0.686 0.2623 14.92 2.393 34.8 7.69 2.04 4.66 0.79 
Q4-
11 1.531 1.78 0.425 0.694 0.2693 15.03 2.41 34.5 8.01 2.03 4.7 0.7 
Q1-
12 1.534 1.76 0.425 0.702 0.2763 15.14 2.428 34.3 8.33 2.01 4.73 0.62 
Q2-
12 1.536 1.74 0.426 0.71 0.2833 15.25 2.446 34.2 8.64 1.99 4.77 0.55 
Q3-
12 1.539 1.72 0.427 0.717 0.2903 15.36 2.464 34.2 8.96 1.98 4.81 0.5 
Q4-
12 1.541 1.7 0.428 0.725 0.2973 15.46 2.481 34.3 9.27 1.96 4.85 0.46 
Q1-
13 1.544 1.69 0.429 0.733 0.3043 15.57 2.499 34.4 9.58 1.95 4.88 0.43 
Q2-
13 1.546 1.67 0.43 0.741 0.3114 15.68 2.517 34.7 9.89 1.93 4.92 0.42 
Q3-
13 1.549 1.65 0.43 0.749 0.3184 15.79 2.534 35.1 10.2 1.92 4.96 0.42 
Q4-
13 1.551 1.63 0.431 0.757 0.3255 15.9 2.552 35.5 10.5 1.91 5 0.43 
Q1-
14 1.553 1.61 0.432 0.764 0.3326 16.01 2.57 36.1 10.8 1.89 5.03 0.46 
Q2-
14 1.556 1.59 0.433 0.772 0.3397 16.11 2.587 36.7 11.1 1.88 5.07 0.5 
Q3-
14 1.558 1.57 0.433 0.78 0.3468 16.22 2.605 37.4 11.4 1.87 5.11 0.56 
Q4-
14 1.560 1.55 0.434 0.788 0.3539 16.33 2.623 38.3 11.7 1.85 5.15 0.63 
Q1-
15 1.562 1.53 0.435 0.796 0.361 16.44 2.641 39.2 12 1.84 5.18 0.71 
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Q2-
15 1.564 1.51 0.436 0.804 0.3682 16.55 2.658 40.2 12.3 1.83 5.22 0.81 
Q3-
15 1.566 1.49 0.436 0.812 0.3753 16.65 2.676 41.3 12.6 1.82 5.26 0.92 
Q4-
15 1.569 1.47 0.437 0.819 0.3825 16.76 2.694 42.5 12.8 1.81 5.3 1.05 
Q1-
16 1.571 1.45 0.438 0.827 0.3896 16.87 2.711 43.8 13.1 1.8 5.33 1.19 
Q2-
16 1.573 1.43 0.438 0.835 0.3968 16.98 2.729 45.2 13.4 1.78 5.37 1.34 
Q3-
16 1.575 1.41 0.439 0.843 0.404 17.09 2.747 46.6 13.7 1.77 5.41 1.51 
Q4-
16 1.577 1.4 0.44 0.851 0.4112 17.19 2.764 48.2 14 1.76 5.45 1.69 
Q1-
17 1.579 1.38 0.44 0.859 0.4184 17.3 2.782 49.9 14.2 1.75 5.48 1.88 
Q2-
17 1.580 1.36 0.441 0.867 0.4256 17.41 2.8 51.6 14.5 1.74 5.52 2.09 
Q3-
17 1.582 1.34 0.442 0.874 0.4328 17.52 2.818 53.4 14.8 1.73 5.56 2.31 
Q4-
17 1.584 1.32 0.443 0.879 0.436 17.63 2.835 55.4 15 1.72 5.6 2.55 
 
 
Legends: 
 
E/$: Euro-USD X-Rate, Inf: Inflation Rate %, GDP: Nominal GDP (USD Trillion) 
Ex: Exports (USD-Billion), Im: Imports (USD Billion), TD: Trade Deficit (USD Billion) 
Pvt Inv: Private Domestic Investment in US (USD Trillion), Int: Interest Rate % 
FDI: FDI in US(USD Billion), Inv-Abr: Investment by US, Abroad (USD Billion) 
MS: Money Supply (USD Billion), U: Unemployment Rate % 
Grw: Nominal GDP Growth Rate % 
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TECHNICAL  NOTES 
 
Trend Equations (Trend Projection Method Unless Stated Otherwise) 
 
1) Consumption = 0.0542 x + 6.1568 
2) Investment (Private) = 0.0177 x +1.4192 
3) Government Spending = 0.0324 x + 1.3603 
4) Net Exports (Trade Deficit) = 0.0038 x + 0.0426 
5) Money Supply = -0.0011 x2 + 0.3459 x + 4.0174 
6) Euro/USD X-Rate = 0.153 ln (x) + 0.91 
7) FDI in US = 4.9248 x + 149.95 
8) Total US Federal Debt = 0.5225 x + 4.257 
9) Interest Rate = 12.678 x -0.4556 
10) Imports = 7.8492 x + 246.45 (Trend Projection) 
11) Inflation Differential = 5E(-06) x3 – 0.001 x2 + 0.0558 x – 1.3107 
12) Inflation Rate = - 0.0193 x + 2.8624 
13) Government Budget Deficit = 18.887 x – 154.66 
14) US Investment Abroad = 0.0463 x2 – 1.3514 x + 44.034 
15) Unemployment Growth Rate = 3E(-05) x4 – 0.0029 x3 + 0.0783 x2 – 0.6878 x + 
                                                        5.7406 
16) Exports = - 75.98 + 327.46 (X-Rate)  [Simple Regression Method] 
17) Nominal GDP = -1.37 + 0.67(Consumption) + 1.22 (Private Investment)  
                                + 2.93(Government Spending) – 3.04(Net Exports) 
      [Multiple Regression Method]  
 
Correlation Table 
 
 
Unemp % X-Rate Interest 
Rate % 
Budget 
Deficit 
Inflation 
Rate 
Exports Imports 
Inflation-
Diff 
 
 -0.1439      
Interest-
Diff 
 0.1053      
Exports 
 0.6219      
Imports 
 0.6278      
Trade Def 
 0.5548      
FDI in US 
 0.1444      
Pvt Inv 
 0.6759      
GDP(Nom) 
 0.6732  0.7996  0.752 0.7742 
Money SS 
  - 0.8325  - 0.2318   
GDP 
Growth % 
0.5342       
US Inv 
Abroad 
  - 0.3287     
Inflation % 
  0.7006     
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